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THE BIA REORGANIZATION FOLLIES OF 1978:
A LESSON IN BUREAUCRATIC SELF-DEFENSE
Russel Lawrence Barsh*
Every time an administrative agency's ineffectiveness rises to public attention these days, it seems, Congress rewards it with more
budget. Caught between public pressure to solve social problems
and Civil Service regulations that frustrate payroll cuts, it is far
easier for legislators to spend more on an agency than to abolish
it and start over again on new principles. That is not the only
reason for agency survival, however.
The agencies themselves have evolved an effective ideological
defense against legislative attack. Agency failure always is attributed to program implementation, rather than program concept or
purpose. Someone else has gotten in the way, e.g., Congress (inadequate delegations of power, insufficient appropriations), past
presidents (bad political appointments), "bad apples" within the
agency itself (now conveniently retired), or even the victims of the
failure, the agency's intended beneficiaries, who are accused of
uncooperativeness, frustration, and ignorance.' This is the
"devil" theory of failure. The agency is the innocent victim of
circumstance and bad intentions, "just trying to do its job."
There also is what might be called the "whoops!" theory of
failure in the liturgy of bureaucratic self-defense. Failure is the
result of a few unwitting errors in management, some carelessness, poor public relations, and misunderstanding ("breakdown
in communication"). No harm was intended, and everyone has
learned their lesson. The program now can proceed without further problems or delay.
Consistent with this logic, agency success readily is attainable
by the application of more money, greater power, subsidizing
more training for middle- and upper-level managers and increasing their share of agency payroll, increasing the agency's knowledge of its clientele by doing more studies of them and giving
them more "input" (i.e., more opportunities to complain),
replacing past presidents' pet labels or slogans with new ones,
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and devoting a greater proportion of agency time and cost on internal data-collection and paperwork. In other words, the worse
an organization does, the faster it gets bigger. Embedded in all
this is the extraordinary assumption that any approach to a given
social problem can succeed at some cost. Once an approach has
been chosen and an organization formed to implement it, funding
is increased until the problem goes away.
I.

The BIA Survival Success Story

The Bureau Is a Regulatory Agency
Congress has abdicated its functions and powers for many
years to a bureau. The result has been just what a great writer
on constitutional government said must always follow
bureaucracy. "A bureaucracy," says he, "is sure to think that
its duty is to augment official power, official business, or official numbers, rather than to leave free the energies of
mankind." That is an exact statement of the attitude of the Indian Bureau, which is the embodiment of bureaucracy, a
despotic, arbitrary domain which has been permitted to exist
and flourish in this land of the free. 2
The Bureau of Indian Affairs is one of the nation's oldest regulatory agencies. Established in 1824, 3 the Bureau now is the
largest subdivision of the Department of the Interior with nearly
15,000 employees and a billion-dollar budget, responsible, in
principle, for serving and protecting the interests of more than
500,000 members of organized Indian tribes and Alaskan Native
communities. Since 1900, the Bureau's budget has increased tenfold,, after adjusting for inflation, while Indians remain the nation's poorest minority.4 Simply abolishing the Bureau and distributing its annual budget as cash would increase Indians' per
capita income by one-third.'
2. W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1976). See also F. PIVEN & CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR. THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL WELFARE (1971).
3. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 238-41 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT], discusses the Bureau's early history in detail.
Originally in the War Department, the Bureau was transferred to the Department of the
Intericr in 1849.
4. Figure 2; LEVITAN & JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING. FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE
AMERICANS 11 (1975); A. SORKIN. AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID 8 (1971).
5. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 1980. APPENDIX 597 (1979).
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Most Bureau services duplicate general federal social programs
such as low-income housing, subsidized education, and grants for
economic and community development. 6 It is questionable
whether separate administration is beneficial. Bureau overhead is
relatively high.7 At least 15% of the Bureau's budget is absorbed
by administration, and another 70% pays for the "expert" personal services of BIA staff to advise and regulate tribal staff; less
than 15% reaches tribes as cash (Figure 1).1 Although each reservation Indian today attracts roughly $250 of federal direct funding through the Bureau to his tribal government, he also attracts
about $380 of direct federal "grants in aid" to the neighboring
state government, which may not serve him fully. 9
BIA services therefore tend to be costly and contribute relatively
little to local government operation. BIA services also tend to be
more centrally planned. Most federal aid to states consists of
"formula grants" allocated automatically on the basis of objectively estimated need, e.g., population, income levels, problem
rates."0 Aid to tribes usually is on a "project" or competitive
basis, affording the granting agency greater discretion over the
use of funds and subjecting tribal grantees to greater risk of discontinuation.' BIA area directors frequently have been accused
6. Temporary sharing of Indian programs with other federal agencies during the
Roosevelt Administration resulted in some permanent transfers, notably the Indian
Health Service to DHEW in 1955. President Johnson's "Great Society" expansion of
federal direct services programs led to the formation of "Indian desks" in most funding
agencies. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 245-56. See also, Hearing, FederalDomestic
Assistance Programs, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearing, Assistance Programs].
7. General Accounting Office, "More Effective Controls Over Bureau of Indian
Affairs Administrative Costs Are Needed" (Feb. 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO].
Since most reservations are net importers of goods and services, they enjoy relatively little
recirculation of federal subsidy dollars. A dollar of federal aid to state residents has more
impact on the state than a dollar of federal aid to tribal members has on their reservation.
Kent & Johnson, "Flows of Funds on the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation," Ninth
District Federal Reserve Bank Economic Information Series (1976). This means BIA programs must be more efficient to bring about the same results as non-Indian services.
8. GAO, supra note 7; FINAL REPORT. supra note 3, at 232, 266-67. About 15% of
the total budget is distributed as state aid, but this is not comparable to the 15% passthrough in BIA programs because so much of the national budget pays for defense and
debt service.
9. Hearing, Assistance Programs, supra note 6, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT &
BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR
ANALYSES 212 (1979).

1980.

SPECIAL

10. Hearings, Assistance Programs,supra note 6, at 20-25.
11. Many formula programs were designed with state governments in mind and have
requirements that only a very large governmental unit can fulfill. Id. at 45; Hearings,
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of manipulating intertribal competition for discretionary funds to
reward cooperation
toward agency survival and to punish non12
cooperation.
Unfortunately, tribes cannot bypass the Bureau completely by
seeking aid from other federal agencies. Tribes are statutorily ineligible for many "federal domestic assistance programs"
(FDAP), and apply for even fewer out of ignorance or because of
inability to comply with conditions drafted with state governments in mind. 13 Tribal governments therefore frequently equate
their own survival with the survival of the Bureau.
The Trust Doctrine
In exchange for services, the Bureau exercises a supervisory
and virtually colonial control of reservation government and resources. The euphemism for this relationship is "trust responsibility." Since the end of the last century, tribal lands have been
held by the United States "in trust for" individual Indians and
their tribal governments. 4 Originally this was a legal fiction invented by the courts to reconcile historical Indian occupancy with
congressional assertions of power to regulate and confiscate Indian lands without Indian consent." Later it was used to explain
why state laws did not extend to Indian country: they had been
preempted by the exercise of federal trusteeship.' 6 Today, the
trusteeship tall wags the whole dog of tribal-federal relations.
Bureau of Indian Affairs Organization, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), at 45 [hereinafter cited as Hearing, BIA].
12. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 94. The area director's "bundle of carrots and
sticks seems endless. If a tribe is cooperative, special funds are found to meet special
tribal projects ....
[If not, a]pproval of tribal actions are often delayed or have to be
changed. Attorney contracts are nit-picked and funds for needed programs never seem to
be available." Id. at 97, 114; Hearings,Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), at 35; Hearings, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, Senate Select Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), at 133. A special "IMPL" account
financed by taxes and fees on trust lands resource development has served as a slush fund
for this purpose. See Memorandum, Deputy Assistant Secretary/Indian Affairs to Area
Directors, "Bureau Policy on the Expenditure of Indian Monies, Proceeds of Labor
Funds," Aug. 16, 1978.
13. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 256-60; Hearing, Assistance Programs,
supra note 6.
14. Statutory authority for the trust status of lands acquired for tribes after 1934 is
found in 25 U.S.C. § 465; there is no specific statutory basis for holding earlier acquired
or original unceded tribal lands in trust.
15. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-56 (1903).
16. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
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To preserve its "preemptive" right to acquire tribal lands, with
or without tribal consent, 7 Congress since 1790 has prohibited
the lease or sale of Indian lands without executive approval.'" In
the 1830s this grew into a more general requirement of federal approval to trade with or to settle among Indians, 19 and by 1871 a
rule rendering any contract or agreement with an Indian or Indian tribes voidable by the United States." Courts long have been
awere that Congress lacks express constitutional authority to
regulate tribes' internal affairs, 2' but nevertheless have implied
such a power from need. "From their very weakness and helplessness," the Supreme Court concluded in 1886, "there arises a
duty of protection, and with it the power." 2 2 Federal expansionist
policies having left tribes "an uneducated, helpless and dependent
people, needing protection against the selfishness of others and
their own improvidence[, o]f necessity, the United States assumed
the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it authority to do
all that was required to perform that obligation ...
"I'
This may have struck a rational chord in the days of Sitting
Bull, but today the average educational level of reservation Indians lags only a couple of grades behind rural whites, 24 and it is
not unusual for tribal officers and entrepreneurs to be better educated than the Bureau employees charged with their protection.2
Recent years understandably have seen reformulation of the trust
concept. Trusteeship increasingly is explained as an implicit bargain struck in the "course of dealings" historically between tribes
and the United States, although contained expressly in no treaty.2
17.
18.
19.
20.

United States v. S.F. Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
1 Stat. 137, 138, 25 U.S.C. § 177.
Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 730, 25 U.S.C. §§ 180, 261-64.
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, § 3, 16 Stat. 570, 25 U.S.C. § 81. Today this may apply only

where the Indian or tribal party is dissatisfied with the bargain. Brown v. United States,
486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973) (tribal attorney contract not automatically void for lack of
federal approval).
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1832).
22. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). The development of tribes'
status in constitutional law is reviewed in detail in R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THI ROAD.
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980) [hereinafter cited as BARSH & HENDERSON].
23. Board of County Comm'nrs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943).
24. LEVITAN & JOHNSTON, supra note 4, at 35-37.
25. An informal survey of Portland area credit, realty, and supervisory staff four
years ago found only one employee in twenty had any formal business, economic, or
technical education beyond a bachelor's degree.
26. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). See generally AIPRC, TRuST
RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP (1976). The current philosophy
of the Department of the Interior is summarized in Memorandum, Interior Dep't
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The Interior Department considers trusteeship "part of the con-

sideration" due from the United States for tribal land cessions. 2

However, there also is a growing tendency for the Supreme Court

to consider trusteeship a "welfare" doctrine, Le., limited to the

period or extent of Indians' supposed helplessness or need. 28

Conflicts of Interest
Trust responsibility is a two-edged sword. In theory, the United
States is accountable to Indians for losses due to mismanagement
under the same standards that apply to private trustees.2 9 For ex-

ample, the Bureau may be compelled to invest tribal trust funds
at the highest available rate of interest." On the other hand, Con-

gress has broken treaties with impunity behind the shield of In-

dians' supposed best interest.3 1 What Congress deems best for In-

dians ordinarily is immune from judicial scrutiny.3" Even in the
Solicitor Leo Krulitz to Assistant Attorney General James Moorman, "U.S. v. Maine,"
Nov. 21, 1978, especially at 10.
27. Memorandum, Krulitz to Moorman, supra note 26, at 3. "I am saying that the
United States of America has to live up to a contract with them just like you have to live
up to a contract with your banker." Address of Interior Dep't Solicitor Leo Krulitz to the
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, Apr. 6, 1979, Pocatello, Idaho.
28. For instance, the Supreme Court recently limited Indian treaty fishing rights to
the number of fish Indian fishermen need to maintain a "moderate living." Washington
v. Washington State Comm. Pass. Fishing Vessel Assoc., 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3075 (1979),
reviewed in BARSH, THE WASHINGTON FISHING RIGHTS CONTROVERSY: AN ECONOMIC
CRITIQUE 123-26 (rev. ed. 1979). There also has been some suggestion of limiting the
United States' obligations to its purpose in accepting the trust, i.e., assimilation. See,
e.g., Board of County Comm'nrs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943) ("to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modem body politic");
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1958) ("Congress has followed a policy calculated
eventually to make all Indians full-fledged participants in American society").
29. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
30. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). This duty does include zealous advocacy on disputed points of law. United
States v. Mason, 411 U.S. 391 (1973) (Interior Department not obligated, as trustee, to
contest jurisdiction of Oklahoma to tax reservation decedents' estates).
31. Viz. the facts in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), or, more recently,
DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977), all dealing with nineteenth-century laws allotting reservations and permitting non-Indian homesteading. As recently as twenty years ago, virtually a whole
reservation was condemned to erect a hydroelectric dam. Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960); Seneca Nation v. United States, 338 F.2d
55 (2d Cir. 1964); Seneca Nation v. Bruckner, 262 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
32. Federal management and disposition of tribal property may be subject to the
fifth amendment limitation on uncompensated takings. E.g., Chippewa Indians v. United
States, 301 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110
(1935); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 678 (1912). The quality or quantity of federal ser-
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equal protection area, "as long as ... special treatment can be
tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indian, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." 3 3 In other words, Congress may discriminate for or
against Indians, if it can offer some policy rationalization.
Federal trusteeship entails conflicts of interest at every administrative level. 4 To begin with, "the BIA is like any institution; it tends to defend its past decisions." 3 5 BIA officers and
solicitors consequently are caught between loyalty to their agency
and protecting Indian rights. The Secretary of the Interior often
must reconcile disputes between the Bureau, advocating Indian
interests, and other Interior subagencies, representing non-Indian
interests, and the President must address trust issues in disputes
between Interior and other Cabinet departments. 6 To make matters worse, Interior Department solicitors often are assigned
simultaneously to BIA and other agencies, such as the Bureau of
Mines and Bureau of Reclamation. 7 Under the circumstances, it
is ironic that Civil Service conflict-of-interest regulations barred
Indian employees of the Bureau from many forms of field service
until 1976.38
vices has not been held actionable. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); National
Indian Youth Council v. Bruce, 485 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973). This does not immunize
BIA administrative actions from judicial review on due process issues, Tooahnippah v.
Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), or to depart arbitrarily from congressional policy, Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). See also Memorandum, Krulitz to Moorman, supra note 26, at
6.
33. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
34. See generally A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF INDIAN NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACrICES AND
PROCEDURES, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. (Comm. Print 1971); Hearing, BIA, supra note
11, at 54-56 (comments of former Associate Solicitor Reid Chambers). This problem was
identified by President Nixon in his 1970 message on Indian affairs, 116 CONo. REC.
23132.
35. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 81.
36. Id. at 8: "When I was Associate Solicitor" for BIA, Reid Chambers told the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1978, "when they wanted to run over the
Indians I was not at those conferences."
37. Id. at 57. For a decade tribes have urged creation of a separate legal office to
represent them and BIA in trust litigation. Id. at 34-35, 40, 44-45, 50-60, 98, 102; Hearings, Indian Trust Counsel Authority, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on
Interior & InsularAffairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearing, BIA, supra, at 100-101.
38. Even now, exemptions are authorized only on a case-by-case basis. Hearing,
BIA, supra note 11, at 156. It has been BIA policy not to appoint as area director a
member of one of the tribes served by that office, on a conflict of interest theory,
regardless of the tribes' wishes. E.g., id. at 21-23, 138-39. This was challenged successfully
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Courts have held that Indians, as beneficiaries of the federal
trust, must be given an opportunity to be heard before federal action is taken to impair their property rights, but Indians have no
substantive right to prevail.3 9 The Interior Department itself ra-

tionalizes that Congress always can confiscate Indian rights in the
exercise of its war, commerce, and eminent domain powers. Congress is limited by trusteeship only when it is acting as trustee.40

This means Congress can circumvent trust responsibility
whenever it wishes. Expansive interpretations of trust respon-

sibility mean little when the Supreme Court can characterize
tribes' essential political rights as "of a unique and limited
character . . . exist[ing] only at the sufferance of Congress,"
4
tribes' trustee, and "subject to complete defeasance." 1

In pursuit of a balanced federal budget, the Carter Administration tested the scope of trust responsibility in 1978. A Justice

Department brief in White v. Califano demoted trusteeship to a
"metaphor" involving only "moral responsibility," insufficient
to support an Indian's claim for federally subsidized health
care.4 2 The Justice Department also warned Congress against

hinting in the preamble of the Indian Child Welfare Act that new
federal child welfare services to tribes imply legally enforceable

financial commitments.

3

These challenges prompted the Interior

Department to work out an agreement with the Justice Depart-

ment "to spell out, clearly and carefully, our joint understanding

in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979), relying on the special Indian career service provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, ch.
576, § 12, 48 Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C. § 472.
39. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 U.S. 252 (1972) (Secretary of Interior
may not authorize Bureau of Reclamation project to divert tribe's water without considering tribe's interests); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (Bureau
of Mines may not assume tribal lessee's mining rights without consulting tribe). See also
Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalTrust Responsibility to Indians, 27 SrAN.
L. REv. 1213 (1975).
40. Memorandum, Krulitz to Moorman, supra note 26, at 6. As a result of this
paradox, perhaps, the United States is more often the defendant in trusteeship litigation
than the plaintiff. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 54.
41. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). "Unlike tribal property rights the
extent of tribal sovereignty is wholly within the discretion of Congress." Krulitz Address
to ATNWI, supra note 27.
42. Brief for the Federal Appellants, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978), at 31-32.
43. H. REp. 95-1386 (1978), at 38 n.4, 40. The Indian Child Welfare Act is Pub. L.
95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. See also Interior Secretary Andrus' comments about Attorney General Bell in Hearing, Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of
the Interior,supra note 12, at 16.
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of what that relationship is.""" According to the agreement, trust
responsibility is "legally enforceable . . . [and] subject to the
same strict standards imposed on any other fiduciary . . . care,

loyalty, and faithful execution," but only in the management and
conservation of tribal lands. Political liberties, services, and selfgovernment are outside of trust protection.
There is reason to suspect that the net effect of trust responsibility is negative. Trust imposes an additional layer of regulation on reservation business transactions, taxing all reservation
economic enterprises with uncertainty, risk, and regulatory compliance costs greater than the costs borne by off-reservation competitors.15 The regulatory tax is greater for Indian-owned
businesses than non-Indian-owned businesses on the same reservations. The result is a characteristic reservation economic pattern: heavy imports from off-reservation producers, Indianowned businesses chiefly of a marginal nature (i.e., little fixed
capital, high turnover, reliance on tax or regulatory loopholes for
competitive advantages), reservation retail trade dominated by
non-Indians, and very low Indian wages. Low reservation wages
and low prices for the sale of reservation resources compensate
businesses for the higher costs of reservation investment.
Policy Cycles and BIA Growth
Congress has by no means accepted the costs and failures of
Indian administration without protest. About once every thirty
years there is a legislative move to end the Bureau. In 1887 the
General Allotment Act ordered the subdivision of reservations into small individual Indian landholdings." The Act's sponsors
supposed this would free Indians from dependence on federal
subsidies and make it possible to dismantle the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The Bureau argued that, for the Indians' protection, it
hold the individual land patents "in trust" until the Indian
owners were capable of managing their own affairs-presumed to be twenty years. Administering trust property and pro44. Krulitz Address to ATNWI, supra note 27.
45. This model of reservation economic structure is developed in Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Administration of Natural Resource Development, 52 N.D. L. REv, 307,
319-22 (1975); Trosper, American Indian Relative Ranching Efficiency, 68 At. EcONONIC
Rev. 503 (1978); Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation
Wealth, 54 WASH. L. REv. 531, 555-58 (1979).
46. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.

47.

BARSH

& HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 63-67.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss1/2

BIA REORGANIZATION FOLLIES

1979]
FIGURE 2.

$19million/year$ 6rmillion/yearI

INDIAN BUREAU EXPENDITURES

160

DECADE AVERAGES IN CONSTANT 1926 DOLLARS
(excludes expendilures of other federal ogencies)

140-

120-

,

$120,000/year

-

$580,000/year

-

201-

1810 1820

Ii0

1840

1850

180

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930 1940

1950 1960

1970

19761978

Sources: Bureau of the Census, HistoricalStatistics of the United States 1789-1945 (1949),
at 299-301, 233; Bureau of the Census, HistoricalStatistics of the United StatesFrom ColonialTimes to 1970 (1975); Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the UnitedStates,
for the years 1970 to 1978; Department of the Treasury, CombinedStatement of Receipts,
Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government, for the years 1945 to 1978.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 7

viding agricultural assistance to allottees justified additional staff
and expenses, of course, and kept the Bureau busy for more than
forty years. 8 During the "allotment period," the Bureau's
budget grew at an annual rate five times faster than it had during
the "treaty period" that preceded it (Figure 2).
Before allotment, the Bureau's budget consisted of appropriations to fulfill specific treaty commitments plus a small amount
for general administration.49 The General Allotment Act was the
first major national Indian program with a wholly legislative
basis and a single central budget. In 1921 Congress further consolidated Indian affairs funding by merging all treaty appropriations and legislative authority into one general, annual appropriation. The Snyder Act50 left to the Bureau the task of distributing
the national Indian budget among tribes and programs. This
simplified the role of Congress but reduced congressional control
of the Bureau.
By 1934, Congress had branded allotment a complete failure,
castigating the Bureau both for conceiving it and for implementing it badly." The agency responded by proposing a new policy
to undo allotment and reverse its effects. The Indian Reorganization Act52 suspended further allotment, re-recognized the boundaries and governments of allotted tribes, and provided capital
for the reacquisition of lost lands. Naturally, the Bureau was
designated to supervise the process and to assist reorganized
tribal governments. This added a new layer of permanent administration to the agency, while all staff and activities established
by the General Allotment Act were continued for the benefit of
the remaining allottees.
Government belt-tightening during World War II led several
congressional committees to investigate the Bureau's political influence over reorganized tribes and the failure of reorganization
to bring about significant economic change." The agency confessed guilt, but again advocated its own brand of reform. One
48. See 61

REc. 4660-61 (1921) for a contemporary critique, and Otis, ThiE
(1972), for more details of the administration of allotments.
49. Discussed in 43 CONG. GLOBE 1811-12, 1821-25 (1871).
50. Act of Nov. 2, 1921, ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208, 25 U.S.C. § 13, as amended by Pub.
L. 94-82, § 410, 90 Stat. 2233.
51. 61 CONG. REc. 4660-61, 4664 (1921); BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 22, at
96-106.
52. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, 462, 465, 476.
53. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 117-25.
CONG.

DAWE; Acr AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS
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by one, tribes would be "terminated," i.e., politically dissolved
without their consent. This was to be a slow, "programmed"
process during which, of course, the Bureau would continue to
administer old services and begin to provide new, more costly ser-4
vices to ease Indians through the transition to state jurisdiction.
Congress adopted this scheme in 195311 and Bureau field activity
at once increased. A network of regional "Area Offices" was
established56 and annual budget increases accelerated to ten times
their allotment-era levels (Figure 2). Within fifteen years, termination had ground to a halt and was abandoned."
For nearly a century, congressional frustration with Indian administration simply resulted in reorganization and temporary
redirection of the Bureau. Laws designed to end the "Indian
problem" and disband the Bureau always contained provisions
for transitional programs and services requiring increased staff,
budget, and responsibilities. Congress' cyclical policy swings
from tribal extinction to tribal preservation actually have
reflected a consistent legislative effort to unload a bureaucratic
organization that simply grows, ratchetwise, with each attempt.
Because Congress has been so anxious to abolish the Bureau, the
Bureau tends to be rewarded, budgetarily, for coming up with
new plans to do away with itself-and with tribes in the process.
The Bureau's budget history makes it clear that termination
policies always pay off better than policies favoring tribal survival
(Figures 2 and 3).
"Self-determination" and the Policy Review Commission
In 1975, Congress adopted a "new direction" in Indian affairs,
heralded by both political parties as the cure for Bureau domination of tribal affairs. 8 The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 59 promised to "transfer" Bureau programs
contractually to individual tribes. Contracts must be renewed annually in the discretion of the Bureau, however, and the Bureau
reserves power to regulate all aspects of service delivery policy ex54. Id.
55. H.R.C. 108, 99 CONG. REC. 9968 (1953).
56. AIPRC, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1976), at
57-58; Hearing, Status of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), at 259.
57. Message of President Nixon, 116 CONG. REC. 23132 (1970).
58. Barsh & Trosper, Title I of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 3 Ai. INDIAN L. REv. 361 (1975).
59. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), 25 U.S.C. § 450.
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cept employment. 60 Contractor tribes become legally responsible

for service quality while Congress and the BIA retain complete
control of funding, a dangerous separation of power and labil-

ity. 6' Moreover, although proponents of self-determination

predicted substantial Bureau staff reductions, the agency actually

created two new staff offices to supervise contracting and provide
transition services. 62 Annual BIA budgetary growth again ac-

celerated, without any increase in the proportion of the budget
reaching tribes as cash (Figure 1). The General Accounting Office
concluded in 1978 that the self-determination
program had done
63
little as yet to free tribes from the Bureau.
In the initial heady idealism of self-determination, Congress
established an American Indian Policy Review Commission4
(AIPRC)composed of congressmen and tribal representatives.
Among other things, the Commission was charged with reviewing
"Federal administration and structure of Indian affairs." ' 6 A
team of ten corporate executives was assembled to study BIA
operations in the field, evaluating "key decision points," information systems, personnel management, and organization."
They found a "notable absence of managerial and organizational
capacity." ' 6 Internal and external communication was poor, decisions were being "made on a day-to-day basis with little longrange planning," employee and program evaluation standards
were "nonexistent," and employee morale was poor. 6 Not60. Barsh & Trosper, supra note 58.
61. In the words of Acoma Pueblo Governor Stanley Paytiamo, "OK, get in your
own canoe and you can paddle it the way you want to. But the paddles have holes in them
and the canoe is remote control." Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization,
supra note 12, at 25.
62. Hearing, Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior,supra note 12, at
33; Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 206.
63. GAO, "The Indian Self-Determination Act-Many Obstacles Remain" (Mar. 1,
1978).
64. Pub. L. 93-580, 88 Stat. 910 (1975). For background on the work of the AIPRC,
see Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 10-12.
65. Pub. L. 93-580, § 4, 88 Stat. 910 (1975).
66. AIPRC, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY iii, 1-3 (1976).
67. Id., 6; AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 268; Hearing, BIA, supra note
11, at 12.
68. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 66, at 6-7.
"Presently, performance standards are primarily informal and subjective. They are based
upon (1) doing what the budget justification says, (2) adjusting to current problems and
demands so long as the individual doesn't stray too far from overall program objectives,
(3) handling demands so as to 'keep the wheels greased' as best as one can, (4) answering
the mail, and (5) spending the total budget allocation. If these criteria are met, perfor-
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withstanding the Bureau's official commitment to selfdetermination,

"Indian input and proximity to decisions is

'69
minimal while bureau response time is excessive."
The Bureau recently had established a "band analysis" budget
process in which tribes were asked individually to give priority to

their programs at 96%, 106% and 116% of the prior year's outlay.70

This did offer tribes some opportunity to participate in budget
distribution, but left primary control in BIA area directors. The
band process was short-range (annual) and incremental, making

it of little value in planning or management, and it included only
about half of the Bureau's budget. 7 Financial management also
suffered from "inadequate and unreliable" information,
disorganized reporting, and lack of performance standards." Instead of forecasting manpower needs from program data, the
Bureau arbitrarily fixed position "ceilings" for each function."
The Bureau's operations manual (BIAM) had grown to a tenfeet-long shelf of "antiquated" and "unfathomable" directives,
resulting in confusion over responsibilities and "many employees
spend[ing] excessive time generating or reacting to rumors.1 4
mance is satisfactory." Hearing, Status of Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization,
supra note 56, at 224.
69. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 66, at 8.
70. Id. at 13-15. Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476, requires that tribes be "advised" of all appropriations estimates before the President's
budget goes to Congress. This has not always been observed. Haas, "Ten Years of Tribal
Government Under I.R.A.," Indian Service Tribal Relations Pamphlet No. 1 (1947), at
11.
71. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 66, at 15-18. See
REPORT, supra note 3, at 269-70, 280-81; FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION
AND STrUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 12-14, 47-48; Hearing, BIA, supra
note 11, at 4-5, 15, 36, 95, 98. Tribes complained of having as little as two days to formulate their priorities, BUREAU OF INDIAN 'AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra at 17; being unable to plan more than one year at a time, Hearing, BIA, supra 26, 36, 39, 49; too
much paperwork, id. at 42; getting what they want only when they go to Congress directly
for special budget add-ons, id. at 46; and inequities, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGE-

also AIPRC, FINAL

supra at 13-15, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFsupra at 48, 60; Hearing, Bureau of IndianAffairs Reorganization,supra note 12,

MENT STUDY,

FAIRS,

at 41-42, 90.
72. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 35.
73. AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 278; FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND
STRUCrURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 12-14; Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at

32, 93. A revision of the BIAM was begun in 1968 but never completed. Hearing,Bureau
of Indian Affairs Reorganization,supra note 12, at 326. Many area directors had complicated things by issuing "bootleg" memoranda, and the breakdown in organization and
distribution of new parts had reached the point that the Bureau was "unable to provide a
complete manual.., upon request." Id. at 326-27.
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Job classification was "chaotic" and supervisors often
"autocratic," AIPRC investigators reported." Spans of control
throughout the Bureau were too broad, tangling administrative
and functional responsibilities to the point that actual program

costs could not be determined reliably.76 Employee incompetence

was attributed to Civil Service protection and to improper ad-

ministration of Indian preference,7 7 established in 1934 to put the
BIA "predominantly in the hands of educated, competent Indians."17 Positions often remained vacant when there were no Indian applicants, or were filled by hiring Indians below classification, practices aggravated by the absence of effective recruitment
or job-specific training. 79 Although Indians for twenty years had
occupied roughly 60 percent of all Bureau positions, most Indian
employees remained GS-7 or lower.8 0 The Bureau had sacrificed
effectiveness by absorbing just enough Indians in lower ranks to
create an appearance of legitimacy.
The AIPRC's Bureau management study made 23 specific

recommendations to improve the delivery of Indian services, in-

74. BuREAu OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 35, 41-42;
AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 268, 271-72.
75. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 34, 38;
AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 270.
76. BUREAU

OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY,

supra note 36, at 42, 49-53;

Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 24, 40.
77. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 34; FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION AND STRUcrURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,

supra note 56, at 56-57; Hearing,

BIA, supra note 11, at 6, 21, 36, 93. According to All-Indian Pueblo Council President
Delfin Lovato, Civil Service protection "perpetuates mediocrity." Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 16. To make matters worse, BIA is one of
the federal government's most unionized agencies, with 75% union representation.
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra at 33.
78. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 32-34, referring to Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 472. See also AIPRC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, 277-78, Indian preference applied only to initial hires, not
promotion, until 1972. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY. supraat 33. The
constitutionality of Indian preference was challenged without success in Morton v. Mancarl, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and in Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 34-35, 39;
AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 270-71.
80. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 276, Hearing, Reduction in Force in the
BIA, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on Interior & InsularAffairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), at 220-27. "Statistics indicate that some 70 percent of the BIA
employees are Indian, but make no mistake about it, non-Indians run the Bureau of Indian Affairs." Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 93.
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crease tribal participation, and reduce administrative overhead."
Formal tribal input at the needs-assessment stage, improved data
bases, zero-base budgeting, and performance-related accounting
would improve financial management; more "realistic" job
classification, clarification of minimum job standards, active
recruitment of Indians, job-specific training, and improved twoway communication at all organization levels would improve staff
efficiency."2 Last, the management study proposed a "matrix"
reorganization, separating administrative and functional activities. s3 Better use of personnel would make it possible to
eliminate one-fourth of the Bureau's workforce, the study
predicted, an annual net saving of $120 million."'
The full Commission went much farther in its final report,
challenging the basic role of the Bureau as a "surrogate local
government." "It is frustrating to the Indian people to be singled
out as being unable to administer governmental functions in a rational, intelligent, and lawful manner when the contrary is, as a
matter of course, presumed for the other [state and local] governments."8 " Bureau "consultation" policies gave tribes no real influence over programs, nor had the Bureau ever demonstrated the
scientific and technical expertise to meet tribes' apparent needs.8 6
To resolve these deeper problems, the Commission recommended creation of a separate, Cabinet-level agency integrating
all federal Indian programs, with its own legal department and a
special Indian career service.8 7 To change the Bureau "from a
81. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 57; AIPRC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 273-74.
82. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 21-30, 35-39,
43-46; AIPRC, TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP (1976),
at 3-8; AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 261-63, 289.
83. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 49-53; Hear-

ing, BIA, supra note 11, at 13.
84. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 9, 31, 36-37,
42 Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 33.
85. AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 232-33. "The State governments do not
have to go elsewhere to another country or another State to find their leadership." Sandia
Pueblo Governor Frank Paisano, in Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization,
supra note 12, at 87.
86. AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 261; FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND
STRUCTuRE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 50-55; Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at
36, 41, 48, 52. BIA resource management has been the object of special criticism.
MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN NATURAL RESOURCES, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR

AFFAIRS (Comm. Print 1976).
87. AIPRC, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 287-89; TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND
THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP (1976), at 3-8. A separate Cabinet-level department
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management to a service agency," area offices would be con-

verted to regional technical services centers, abolishing their line

authority. 8 "Legislation establishing tribal governments as equal

to State governments in Federal domestic assistance programs"
would free tribes further from BIA domination by making them

eligible for direct formula funding.

9 The

Commission proposed

entrusting the implementation of its recommendations to a

special oversight unit in the Office of Management and Budget,
free from BIA influence; elevating the Commissioner of Indian

Affairs to Assistant Secretary of the Interior; and creating, to
guarantee tribal participation, a presidentially appointed Indian

"Board of Regents" for the Bureau. 9

Reorganization Fever
South Dakota Senator James Abourezk, chairman of the

American Indian Policy Review Commission, became chairman
of the newly organized Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1977. 91 While the administration moved to appoint an
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, Abourezk
sought a congressional mandate for implementation of the

AIPRC's Bureau management recommendations. 92 In July, he
convened oversight hearings to ascertain the Bureau's response to

reorganization and to apply pressure for action.

3

was proposed first by the National Congress of American Indians in 1971. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 61; AIPRC FINAL
REPORT, supranote 3, at 285-86. Creation of a separate Indian rights legal unit by legislation failed in 1973. Hearings,Indian Trust Council Authority, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973). See also
Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 34-35, 40, 44-45, 54-63; Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 3-6.
88. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 298-99; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
MANAGEMENT STUDY, supranote 36, at 8. According to some witnesses, area offices are a
"bottleneck" to Bureau approval of local action. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS. supra note 56, at 49, 58-59.
89. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 257-59, 296. Tribes could use formula
grants to hire their own technical consultants, bypassing the Bureau, an option more supportive of self-determination but "often overlooked." Id. at 261; Hearing, BIA, supra
note 3, at 8, 23, 36, 53.
90. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 298-99; FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND
STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 61, 63; BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 36, at 9.
91. S.R. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) established the Select Committee for a term
of two years. The AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 293-96, 299, recommended that
the Select Committee be given permanent status.
92. S.R. 135, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
93. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 1-3, 12-13.
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Tribal and AIPRC witnesses emphasized reform of area offices, accusing area directors of "buffering" policy changes, logjamming decisions in paperwork and in nailbiting over authority,
and using their hiring and budgetary powers to play tribes off
against one another. 4 Because of area inefficiency, the Bureau
had become "one of those odd institutions where the totality is
less than the sum of its parts.""5 Skilled at bureaucratic "survival
management," witnesses predicted, area directors would defeat
any attempt to reform the Bureau by marshalling the support of
local politicians, other federal agencies, and, under coercion of
ransoming programs, the tribes themselves.96 "They treat all administrations with equal disdain." 97 There was general agreement
that areas' line authority must be abolished. 98
Witnesses were not optimistic for basic change. "[D]ynamic
new leadership" was needed, presumably from the new assistant
secretary.9 9 "[Ilt doesn't make any difference how you restructure BIA . . . as long as you have the same individuals with the
same mentalities and the same ideas ... nothing will change." 00
More witnesses warned that new, idealistic BIA employees would
be burdened by the same old regulations and organization and
would either "yield" or quit in frustration)10'
The Select Committee was disarmed, at first, by the Interior
Department's apparent enthusiasm for reform. Undersecretary
of the Interior James Joseph told the Select Committee that
AIPRC criticism "dovetail[ed]" with his department's concerns,
and that dieting the Bureau down to a technical assistance agency
would be consistent with President Carter's overall administrative
reorganization plan.0 2 The new assistant secretary nominee, For94. Id. at 91, 94, 97, 100-101. Tribes complained that incompetent area directors had
been reassigned to other area offices in lieu of discipline, calling it "musical chairs."
Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 98-99.
95. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 61.
96. Id. at 97-98, 100-101, 103.
97. Id. at 98, 101. Of the Bureau's relationship to Congress, witnesses complained
that "when the Bureau gets done writing the regulations" for new federal Indian legislation, "it is almost unrecognizable." Id. at 37.
98. Id. at 13, 30, 34-35, 41, 48, 51, 53.
99. Id. at 2-3, 34-35, 62-63. See also Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 5-6.
100. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 35.
101. Id. at 43, 93.
102. Id. at 106-107, 111, 131, 149. The same month the AIPRC management study

was released (September 1976), the Bureau completed an internal "Personnel Management Action Plan" which, while considerably narrower in scope, arrived at many of the
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rest Gerard, was committed to change and would oversee the process personally, "remov[ing]" resisters." 3 Because modification

of area structure would necessitate "detailed planning," an internal BIA task force would be assembled to work with the assistant
secretary.' 4
Conceding "band analysis" had been an "imperfect process,"
the department promised a new, consolidated zero-base budget
system with formal tribal participation, as well as modernized
data processing and an updated operations manual. 0 5 The
department also would make a greater effort to recruit qualified
Indians through intern programs and a job skills bank, and
would explain Indian preference more fully to non-Indian
employees.' 0 6 A manpower forecasting specialist already had been
hired; job-specific training, better job classification, and regular
personnel evaluations soon would be implemented. 0 7 National
training and technical assistance facilities would be consolidated,
just as the AIPRC had suggested. 08

On more fundamental issues, however, Undersecretary Joseph
and the Department waffled. A "matrix" organization was out
of the question, and so was the idea of an independent Indian affairs legal unit. 10 9 Although tribes would be encouraged to buy

more technical services outside of the government, Interior would
not agree to lay off admittedly poor BIA technical staff."10 Area

same conclusions. Id. at 162-285. The Action Plan was to have been finalized by
December 1977, id. at 162-63, but by early 1978 was bogged down in administrative
delays, Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 324. Interestingly, the Action Plan's author, Paul Lorentzen, described himself as "often
discouraged" while writing it by BIA employees' cynicism about organizational change.
Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 163.
103. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 115.
104. Id. at 108, 112-13.
105. Id. at 107, 119, 137-38, 140-41, 144-47, 160-61. The Department did not assume
all of the blame, however; tribes' noninvolvement in budgeting also was attributed to high
turnover among tribal officers and "apathy and mistrust." Id. at 144-46, 148.
106. Id. at 131-32, 148-50. The proposed "Indian Intake Program," essentially an
entry-level internship for Indians, and the skills bank both originated in AIPRC recommendations. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 261-62, 296-97.
107. Hearings, BIA, supra note 11, at 134-36, 148, 150-53. How job-specific the
Department's proposed courses were may be debated. They included "upward mobility,"
"promotion," and "career development." Obviously, Interior felt BIA employees should
be working on their own futures, not the tribes'.
108. Id. at 141-42; AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 262-64, 289, 296-97.
109. Id. at 117, 121-22, 142. See also Hearing,Nomination of the Assistant Secretary
of the Interior,supra note 12, at 14-16, 26-27.
110. Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 136.
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offices would retain control of budget formulation, and Bureauwide management performance standards would not be
developed."' Leaving each area to work out its own objectives
and standards would be more consistent with tribal diversity and
with self-determination, the Department argued, ignoring the fact
that tribes themselves had demanded this change. ' A clue to the
Department's true agenda was its admission that reorganization
already had been used to justify increased fiscal year 1979 budget
requests, although it would not commit to an implementation
timetable and warned that predicted savings from management
changes had been unrealistic." 3 Carefully limited, reorganization
was beginning to look like a good excuse for BIA growth.
Bureaucratic mobilization of defenses continued a month later,
during Senate confirmation hearings for assistant secretary
nominee Forrest Gerard. Gerard pledged to implement the
AIPRC report, which he praised, and to bring about "fundamental reform" in the Bureau to strengthen tribal government and
federal services." 4 He was careful to dismiss tribes' criticisms of
the Bureau, however. "Although some criticism is surely warranted, the Bureau has not always been able to respond fully to
all demands because of inadequate staffing, structure and
resources.""' A few employees were incompetent or not "imbued" with the right attitudes, but that was bound to happen in
any large organization." ' Some reduction in force was likely, but
certainly not to the degree the AIPRC had anticipated." 7
The Indian Self-Determination Act had been "designed... to
transfer power from the Bureau to the Indian tribes," Senator
Abourezk observed, but the Bureau had been "increasing its personnel rather than decreasing it ...using Public law 93-638 as an
excuse for the increase."" 8 He warned Gerard "to work yourself

111. Id. at 115-17, 158-60.
112. Id., and sources at note 88, supra.
113. Id. at 118, 144-45, 148, 150, 152, 158.
114. Hearing, Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior,supra note 12, at
18, 20-21, 24, 26, 28. Gerard declared his "belie[f] in and support" of tribal sovereignty
and tribal jurisdiction over reservation non-Indians. Id. at 44-45.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id. at 27, 29.
117. Id. at 27, 29, 64.
118. Id.at 33, 43. Although he agreed that the Indian Self-Determination Act had not
been implemented fast enough, id. at 19, Gerard would not commit himself as to whether
the Act had been used to justify payroll growth. This was somewhat disingenuous on his
part, for he had been a principal draftsman of that legislation. Id. at 2, 4, 5, 33-34.
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out of a job rather than... into a perpetual job."' 1 9 The purpose of the new assistant secretaryship had been to begin reducing the Bureau's domination of tribal affairs, and the first step in
that direction should be the immediate elimination of area office
line authority.
Gerard admitted "[a]lIready there has been furious politicking
of the Indian community by the area directors to try to undercut
and destroy this particular reorganization plan," 120 as critics of
the Bureau had predicted, but apparently he was prepared to
make concessions. Area offices eventually would "change their
character" and he would make an "unqualified commitment" to
strip area directors within one year of their hiring and budget
powers,' 21 but no area offices would close or lose their line
authority. 122 Although, not unselfishly, he supported the AIPRC
goal of a Cabinet-level Indian agency, Gerard strongly opposed
the other two major AIPRC reorganization goals, a separate Indian career service and an independent Indian affairs legal

unit. 121
II.

The Reorganization Counterproposal

Tactical Circumspection
The fate of the AIPRC's reorganization proposal illustrates the
defensive value of restudying an issue until you get the answer
you want. Each new study of a management problem departs incrementally from the original until, confused and frustrated,
critics accept defeat. In December 1977, shortly after his confirmation as the first Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian
Affairs, Forrest Gerard appointed a task force of BIA insiders
and outsiders to review the AIPRC report and draft an implementation plan. 24 Cautioning task force members to address
119. Id. at 31. See also Montana Senator John Melcher's comment, id. at 4.
120. Id. at 35.
121. Id. at 35-36, 41-43, 54.
122. Id. at 35-36. Astonishingly, Gerard expressed concern that cities in which area
offices currently are located would be hurt by closings, id. at 35-36, 64, strange talk from
someone who had pledged to be an "advocate rather than an adversary" for tribes, id. at
22, 24.
123. Id. at 26-27, 48-49, 52. He also rejected the AIPRC's recommendation that BIA
service delivery performance standards be established by contracts with the tribes served.
Id. at 65-66. At his confirmation hearings, Interior Secretary Andrus had been agreeable
to formation of a Cabinet-level agency, however. Id. at 115.
124. The task force's charge can be found in Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Reorganization, supra note 12, at 130-41. Earl Old Person, chairman of the task force,
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"fundamental," not "cosmetic" issues, Gerard gave priority to
four Bureau missions: service delivery, tribal self-determination,
25
tribal participation, and long-range planning.'
The task force's March 31, 1978 report succeeded in deflecting
attention from many of the Bureau's problems. In its own
defense, the task force complained that budgetary constraints had
limited the scope of its work. 26 Observing almost apologetically
that "it is people, not structures or systems, that will make this
reorganization work," the task force also seems to have anticipated limited
Bureau implementation of its recommendations,
27
however mild.'
Some of these recommendations may appear "old hat" or
simple-minded-obvious to those familiar with previous BIA
studies or with current management and organization practice.
But the most significant change resulting from the work of the
Task Force will be the actual implementation for the
first time
2
of recommendations made repeatedly in the past. 1
The task force "strongly suggest[ed] that this effort not be
treated as 'just another study,' but that it receive a major departmental commitment into carrying it forward into implementation." This proved to be wishful thinking.
According to the task force, the Bureau's "mission" is to "advocate" and "protect the inherent rights of Indian tribal and
Alaska Native self-government. "129 Noting the increasing frequency of conflicts among tribal, federal, and state economic
policies, the task force argued that "[d]ecisions affecting the use
of Indian and Native Alaskan natural resources should be made
by affected tribes."' 30 Nothing in their report actually would
have given tribes more control of their destinies, however, nor
greater independence from national policies adverse to Indian inand chairman of his tribe, was a friend of Assistant Secretary Gerard, and had testified at
Gerard's confirmation hearings. Hearing, Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of the
Interior,supra note 12, at 79. The task force was organized pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), and was, according to Assistant Secretary Gerard, independent of the Bureau. Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Reorganization, supra at 141.
125. Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 131.
126. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,285, 16,287, 16,296 (1978).
127. Id. at 16,284, referring to the Secretary's choice of "what portions of the Report
will be accepted for implementation," and id. at 16,285.
12g. Id. at 16,284.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 16,299.
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terests. Instead, the task force hoped Indians' "uncertainty, anxiety, and distrust" could be mitigated by assurances of better
Bureau training, planning, and communication. This hardly
could have pleased the Bureau's critics. Improving BIA efficiency
without a significant transfer of power would serve only to increase the agency's ability to interfere in tribal affairs.
Agency Self-Serving. Many task force recommendations were
self-serving, e.g., protecting or increasing Bureau positions and
promotional opportunities, augmenting the power of Bureau
managers, and strengthening line authority. Besides enhancing
the status and income of federal employees, these proposals
would have given the Bureau greater unity to resist political
pressure from tribes. From a client's perspective, a weak service
agency is a problem, but a weak and disorganized regulatory
agency is a blessing.
Centralizing Power. The task force proposed increasing the
new assistant secretary's deputies from one to three to "match
the top level jobs to the variety of types of skills and experience
the Assistant Secretary is likely to need."' 3 This would help
"establish the Assistant Secretary as the focal point for leadership in ...Indian programs" and make him more effective as the
government's "chief policy and Congressional relations officer"
for Indian affairs. 3 2 The assistant secretary's personal staff
would need to be increased from five to seven by the addition of
a legal specialist and a specialist in "executive management
development" to serve as recruiter and administrator of executive
training. 33 Staff salaries would be increased as well.
Two new national advisory committees were proposed. The
Secretary of the Interior, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs,
and Interior Department Solicitor would serve as an "Indian
Trust Council," to "be the policymaking body in all matters
where Interior has responsibility over Indian Trust Rights," i.e.,
natural resources owned by Indians."' At a higher level, a
"Federal Indian Trust Committee" of the Vice-President,
Secretary of the Interior, and Attorney General would have
"wide latitude to focus on issues and policy questions which concern the national interest."
131. Id. at 16,293, Recommendation #1.

132. Id.at 16,293, 16,295.
133. Id. at 16,295, Recommendation #2.

134. Id.at 16,299, Recommendation #23.
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The task force apparently assumed that the national government as a whole is solicitous of Indian rights and is prevented
from protecting Indians only by a bad Bureau. However, the task
force itself recognized the Bureau's frequent role as tribes' only
advocate in the Capitol; only the Bureau has a selfish interest in
tribes' survival. Departmental and Cabinet-level trust committees
would have entrusted Indian policy to officials more commonly
the targets than the supporters of Bureau advocacy. In a conflict
over national energy policy and tribal economic development,
tribes might prefer a decision from the Bureau, which would
resist wholesale confiscation of the lands and resources it
manages, than from the Secretary of the Interior or the VicePresident, both of whom are subject more directly to non-Indian
political influence.
Reorganization therefore would have stripped tribes of the one
real benefit they reap from the Bureau-its selfish advocacy of
tribal survival. At the same time, high-level oversight committees
and greater central power would have created an appearance of
tighter control and accountability, "in the national interest."
Everyone in Washington would have been happy. Subject to
cosmetic oversight, the Bureau would be left alone again; top
BIA managers would gain power and income; and non-Indian interests would have a more direct voice in the formulation of Indian trust policy.'"
The task force proposed centralizing some of the line authority
of the area directors, rather than decentralizing
it to agencies and
36
tribes as the AIPRC had recommended.'
Historically, Area Directors have developed their own
organizational structures and modes of operation largely in the
absence of, sometimes in spite of, leadership from the Central
Office. .

.

. Area Directors have assumed a great deal of

autonomy and discretionary latitude in decision making."'
From a tribal point of view, decentralization, as distinguished
from mere local capriciousness, can be a boon. As the task force
135. If the task force approach had been adopted, the clumsy and consistently
survival-oriented bureaucratic trust policy of the Bureau would have been replaced by the
four-year cycles of presidential politics.
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,292, 16,296 (1978). Former Associate Solicitor Reid Chambers
criticized the trust council as "too much of a target" for political pressure and a mere
"showpiece." Hearing,Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization,supra note 12, at 7-8. It
also would be "another layer of bureaucracy." Id. at 14.
137. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (1978).
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itself observed, "[t]he Areas are diverse, each with widely differing (if not unique) tribal and agency needs to serve."' 3 8 "It is
clear, given the bewildering complexities and varieties of tribes,
locations, natural resources, interests and service needs that have
to be dealt with on Area levels, that Area Directors must be
highly flexible,
competent, and knowledgeable of local
39
concerns.'
However, the task force felt most of the policy differences
among areas was a problem reflecting breakdowns in line authority, and urged the assistant secretary to appoint area directors
"willing to execute both the letter and spirit of his policies."' 4 0
They urged direct political appointment of area directors outside
of the Civil Service, not to subject incompetents to risk of
dismissal, but to guarantee directors' loyalty to the assistant
secretary."' From the Bureau's point of view, it seems, the real
problem was that local and regional offices "tended to respond
to the more immediate pressures from tribes," rather than be
"accountable" to the Central Office.' 42
Increasing Career Opportunities. Besides supporting expansion of the assistant secretary's office, the task force advocated
enlarging several existing Bureau subdivisions and creating new
ones to increase resource protection and development activities.
The Rights Protection Office was to have more Central Office
staff and a new satellite "legal staff" unit in each of the Bureau's
more than eighty agencies.' 4 3 Each agency also would need "its
own trust advocate." The task force did not indicate whether
these "advocates" would be lawyers authorized to advance tribal
rights in litigation, engineers needed to protect tribal resources,
public relations officers, or flak-catchers to buffer the Bureau
from tribes' complaints.
Along the same lines, the task force recommended creation of
two new Central-level offices, an Office of Resources Development for resource inventory and planning "on a tribe-by-tribe
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id., Recommendation #13.
141. Id., 16,297, Recommendation #14. Some tribal representatives feared this would
make area directorships "political plums" subject to the "whims of Washington." Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 17, 105. The idea of

political appointment originally was Assistant Secretary Gerard's.
142. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,296 (1978).
143. Id., 16,300 Recommendations ##24, 25. Reid Chambers expressed concern that
this might "disperse" the Bureau's legal talent. Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Reorganization, supra note 12, at 9.
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basis," and an Office of Business and Economic Development to
provide Indian entrepreneurs "sophisticated assistance in finance,
economics, and marketing.""'4 The two new offices would
"develop the necessary infrastructure.., for qualified Indian entrepreneurs," "stimulate venture capital" and coordinate financing, and "lower the administrative barriers to Indian entrepreneurship" arising from federal laws and regulations.
The Bureau already was spending more than $80 million annually for resource management and development when this proposal was made; another $80 million was being spent by the
Departments of Labor and Commerce.' 45 It is incredible that a
sum in excess of $1 million per reservation each year was insufficient to provide technical assistance of the nature suggested.
Were existing field staff incompetent? The task force would have
added one more layer of central administration to an already ineffectual program.' 4
You can't be the doctor if you're the disease. With one hand,
the ]Bureau would continue to spend millions on field staff to
supervise, and thereby tax reservation economic enterprise. With
the other, new Bureau offices would be spending millions on field
staff to "lower the administrative barriers to Indian entrepreneurship." Instead of reducing reservation white tape and
the load of Bureau economic regulation directly, the task force
solution was to hire new regulators to regulate the old regulators.
This is becoming familiar in our government. The Department of
Agriculture continues to subsidize tobacco farmers while the
Surgeon General mounts advertising campaigns to persuade people to stop smoking. Bad programs aren't killed. They are
overlaid with counter-programs, at ever-increasing cost.
To address the problem of employee incompetence, the task
force urged more on-the-job training. "There is limited capability
in the Bureau to prepare BIA employees in their assignments or
to develop tribal expertise in program administration. A massive
training effort is required." '' 47 Training would quality BIA staff
"to occupy higher level appointments, not only within BIA, but

144. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,300 (1978), Recommendations ##24-25.
145. LEvirAN & JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 20.
146. The task force also recommended consolidating all of the Bureau's training and
technical assistance operations, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,295 (1978), Recommendation #5, but this
also would have required a new Central layer of management to "oversee" the combined
program. Id.
147. Id.
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throughout the Federal government as a whole.""'4 This allusion
to an "up-and-out" process hints that tribes would not necessarily
benefit from better-trained Bureau staff. Perhaps BIA employment standards have been so low that increasing employees'
credentials simply would trigger outward migration. BIA personnel structure does appear to have traded off high levels of skill
for large numbers of employees. Indeed, the task force assumed
its "massive training effort" would necessitate borrowing expertise from other agencies. "Because management competence is
lacking in many areas, outside experienced managers must be
brought in to do and teach at the same time, either through
varities of on-the-job training, or by means of intensive
minicourses of short duration."' 1 9 Why hadn't the Bureau hired
"experienced managers" in the first place? If Bureau positions
have been unattractive, relatively low-paid, overclassified, and
largely protected from competition, current employees' only incentive to take new training opportunities seriously would be the
possibility of outward mobility.
Protective Coloration. The task force was not a little concerned about BIA job security, promising to "make constructive
changes . . . but not change only for the sake of change," and
assuring the assistant secretary that reorganization "need not
result in major disruption and anxiety" among employees. "[I]f
civil servants are replaced, alternative Civil Service jobs should be
found for them, or they should be otherwise provided for via early
retirement or by other means.""'i ° More than a practical regard
for the power of the Civil Service Commission and federal
employees unions was involved here. Although a major factor in
retarding reservation economic development, the Bureau is the
nation's largest employer of Indians. A cynic might say that
Bureau jobs are one form of public assistance specially available
to Indians. Indian organizations have opposed some past attempts to "RIF" the Bureau on the grounds of increased Indian
unemployment.1 5 ' For that reason, Indian preference serves as
protective coloration for the agency; it can turn red when it needs
to.

148. Id., 16297.

149. Id.
150. Id., 16293, 16301. Guaranteed reassignment also was provided in Section 105 of
the Indian Self-Determination Act. See 25 C.F.R. § 401.77.

151. Hearing, Reduction in Forcein the BIA, supra note 80, at 2-4.
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A philosophy of augmenting Indian income through federal
employment is incompatible with reservation economic development. Fattening the Bureau payroll diverts public funds from
reservation capital formation and conventional career education
for private-sector employment. It increases the complexity of the
Bureau and the federal white tape that ensnares reservation enterprises. Indian payroll growth is a self-feeding process, moreover.
As more Indians' fortunes become dependent on BIA survival,
political pressure for expansion of the agency at tribes' expense
increases. In short, offering Indians preferential employment was
the smartest thing the Bureau ever did.
Cosmetic Management
Many task force recommendations involved appearances, client
pacification, and public relations, e.g., giving Indians more "input" to decision making without any greater control, and issuing
high-sounding but unenforceable policy directives. Cosmetic
management works only when clients and critics are taken in by
the disguise. This places a premium on maintaining the semblance
of sincerity and trust with the clientele.
Saying Nice Things About Indians. Commenting on tribes'
fear that self-determination contracting might be "merely
another form of termination, in which services once performed
by agencies of the government will be contracted out, and then
funding will be cut off," the task force recommended placing
contracting directly in the assistant secretary's office.' 2 This
would "reflect the high level of commitment" of the Bureau to
self-determination, but would not resolve the problems tribes
feared. Similarly, the task force urged the Secretary of the Interior to "periodically state publicly his support [for] Indian selfdetermination" as a way of improving "credibility" with tribes,
and suggested that contract funding "should reflect the funding
needs at the reservation level to underscore that the Federal
Government is serious about self-determination."' 3 Trust
responsibility, too, should be "clearly statcd, understood, and
supported by managers."
"Plans for all education-related activities should include
statements or steps which recognize or reinforce Indian or Alaska
54
Native cultural heritage as a basis for identity and strength."'1
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,285, 16,295, Recommendation #4 (1978).
153. Id., 16,296 Recommendation #13; id., 16,297, Recommendation #16.
154. Id., 16,302, Recommendation #31.
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The task force recognized that
the overwhelming bulk of [federal education] funds are administered outside tribal and community control, despite the
fact that the statutory objective of federal Indian policy is to
begin "an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful
participation by the Indian people in the
planning, conduct,
'1 5
and administration of these programs."
Including boilerplate cultural heritage declarations in federally
controlled education activities hardly would do much to change
this situation, however. The only way to assure appropriate
cultural content in Indian education is to have Indian control of
schools. Indeed, the task force proposal could have reduced Indian control of education content. Requiring cultural "statements
or steps" in tribes' applications for BIA funding of education
would have given the Bureau one criterion for disapproval: inadequate cultural content.
Harmlessly Vague Goals. Several task force recommendations set laudable goals in language too vague for meaningful implementation or accountability. According to the task force, the
Bureau should "strengthen" trust responsibility; funding
"should be related to needs" or "soundly based on [local]
needs," and should be "effectively integrated"; trust protection
units should have "strong, versatile staff'; staff should have new
job descriptions "reflecting the unique aspects of the particular
area" and including "clear performance standards"; and
15 6
management should take advantage of "positive incentives."
No one would argue with these statements in principle, but
whether any particular management action conformed to them
would depend entirely upon the point of view of the evaluator.
Many different budget formulas could be "related" to a tribe's
needs, even ones the tribe would oppose. "Versatility" cannot be
measured.
Generalizations of this kind can be applied to almost any
organization with equal validity and equal uselessness. They are
nothing more than the textbook synonyms for contemporary
good management practice. Making them work involves attention
to the peculiarities of individual cases, and in this regard the task
155. Id., 16,301.
156. Id., 16,295-16,300, Recommendations #5,

8, 11,

15, 16, and 23 [emphasis

mine].
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force offered no light. There are endless possibilities for devising
"positive incentives," for example, but who will be rewarded for
what, how, and by whom, must depend upon the character, functions, and goals of employees.
Increasing Indian Input. Federal agencies characteristically
respond to clients' demands for control by offering them
"input." Some day, perhaps, we will substitute "input" for the
electoral franchise. The task force promised Indians "input" in
the place of self-determination. "The assistant secretary should
establish a regular, informal process through which he can make
direct contacts to hear the views of a wide variety of field
employees of the BIA, Indian tribal members, and Alaska
Natives,"'" they advised, but not for tribes' sake: "The major
rationale for this recommendation is to correct the complete
absence of upward communication within the Bureau. It is also
intended to improve morale among BIA employees by providing
rank and file field employees a means of access to top management." ' All this means is that the assistant secretary should
spend more time listening to staff and client gripes. Could that be
satisfied by attending more pow-wows and testimonial dinners?
The task force also advised the Bureau to "[c]learly define the
consultation process" as it relates to Indians, without suggesting
any real transfer of power.
The consultation process is clearly meaningless if it is nothing
more than random information haphazardly collected from
groups prior to a decision made by the Federal government
agency involved. On the other hand, consultation cannot be
broadly interpreted to mean that Federal appointments or decisions by59 the Federal trustees can be vetoed by a tribe or
group. 1
To make it clear to tribes what "input" means, the task force
recommended circulating a statement to the effect that "consultation does not convey veto power," but is only a "process of communication with tribes and groups on policy . . . by providing
them with an opportunity for review and response." No commitment would be made to reject even those actions vociferously and
unanimously opposed by tribes. Indians still do not know what is
good for them; the Bureau must remain independent of tribes'
157. Id., 16,295, Recommendation #3.
158. Id.
159. Id., 16,304.
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wishes if it is to fulfill its "obligations" as their trustee. Selfdetermination notwithstanding, it still comes down to helping Indians whether they like it or not, rather than assisting tribal aims
with capital and expertise.
The task force interpreted "clarification" of the consultation
process to mean formalizing "who is the appropriate person 1or
60
group to consult" and "when consultation is appropriate.'
This actually would have reduced Indian participation in BIA
decisions because deciding who is appropriate to listen to involves
deciding who is not, and deciding what actions require prior
review involves deciding what actions do not. The task force provided the Bureau with an excuse for officially excluding certain
groups from decisions. They even recommended inviting only
"national Indian organizations" to participate "on matters of
national Indian priority," consulting regional associations and
161
tribal governments only in actions affecting them specially.
Neither the National Congress of American Indians nor the National Tribal Chairmen's Association can claim to speak for all
tribes, much less all Indians. 62 Institutionalizing these organizations as Indians' national representatives would limit debate,
alienate and isolate tribes from the federal government, and en63
trench an elite of national Indian influence brokers.
This could not help but benefit the Bureau. Since the
Depression-era administration of Commissioner John Collier, the
Bureau has held regional tribal meetings before taking major action. Transcripts of Indians' comments at "Uncle Sam's Road
Show" have been used to lobby Congress for more Bureau positions and budget, but road shows also have provided tribal officials opportunities to meet at federal expense and to organize
coalitions for or against Bureau policy. The task force seemed to
favor abandoning these mass tribal meetings for simpler, cheaper,
and perhaps more polite roundtables with the officers of the national Indian associations, in the capital.
Indians should have "[m]aximum participation.., in the decisionmaking process" in education, the task force argued, recommending that schools operated by the Bureau "as soon as possi160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Indeed, NTCA originally was organized and funded by the federal government,
Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 8, and both
organizations have depended in large part on federal grants and contracts, Hearing,
Nomination of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior,supra note 12, at 33.
163. I.e., the "Washington Redskins," Hearing, BIA, supra note 11, at 16.
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ble" be turned over to community school boards. 64 Although
these boards would have continued to depend upon the Bureau
for annual funding, they would have been "accountable to
students, parents, tribal and village governments, and school administrators for the quality of education."' 6 5 Powerless to prevent budget cuts but visibly responsible and legally liable for program failure, community school boards' positions would be
unenviable ones, conducive to a breakdown of Indian confidence
in Indian government. This is what many tribes feared would
result from self-determination contracting.
Ducking
Ducking actions delay change and deflect criticism.
Bureaucratic ducking usually takes the form of commissioning
further studies of problems. Closely related is generating mountains of new internal paperwork on the pretense of planning and
implementing changes. Ducking also can take the form of truly
trivial, but time-consuming and misleading organizational
changes that either slow critics down or throw them off the track.
The only disadvantage of ducking is that it often is costly for an
agency to cast out a smokescreen of superficial changes and
paper-more costly than adopting harmlessly vague goals, for instance.
The Paper Mill. Thirty years ago Commissioner Collier
employed a staff of anthropologists to evaluate the cultural appropriateness of field programs, and the Bureau already was
under congressional fire for its "survey habit.""' It still is a
problem. The task force called for new paperwork at every level
of the Bureau. The merits of new documentation depend, of
course, on what will be discovered and what will be done about it.
The Bureau was advised to develop "clear organizational and
programmatic objectives" and to engage in a "systematic review
and periodic restatement of priorities."' 6 7 Each area office
should "establish tribal needs."' 66 A national "statement of the
philosophy of education for Indians and Alaska Natives should
be formulated," and "community and tribal [educational] needs

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

43 Fed. Reg. 16,301 (1978).
Id., 16,301-302, Recommendation #29.
S. REp. No. 310, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), at 19.
43 Fed. Reg. 16,298 (1978), Recommendation #17.
Id., 16,296, Recommendation #9.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss1/2

1979]

BIA REORGANIZATION FOLLIES

assessments" should be conducted nationwide. 169 Each BIA
service-delivery unit "should be carefully reviewed" for possible
reorganization, and each office and function of the entire agency
should be subject to an annual management audit.1 70 At all levels,
goals would be set and performance monitored by federal
employees, not by the tribes.
Needs and objectives are highly subjective, and "[w]e have
tons of them already."''" A new series of national needs
assessments could be used to justify existing programs, not to improve them. Even if the Bureau were committed to adopting
tribes' own priorities, they might be formalized in meaninglessly
vague language. For example, one tribe's "goals," as drafted by
a private consulting group working on a HUD comprehensive
planning grant, are to
Maintain [the rieservation as a cultural, economic, social, and
political unit for the continuing benefit of the tribal members.
Utilize the natural resources of the reservation in the best interest of the tribal members, collectively and individually.
Create opportunities for productive, satisfying employment for
every member of the ... [t]ribe who desires to work on or adjacent to the reservation.
Making available housing and education opportunities, including job training, for both young people and adults.
Provide community services and a satisfactory living environment.
Understanding history as it relates to present problems.
72
Land acquisition.1
Who would disagree? Only the seventh and last of these goals can
be measured objectively, however. Outside observers could
disagree whether tribal members had "satisfying" jobs or natural
resources had been applied to tribal members' "best interest."
Any kind of housing would satisfy the fourth goal, but that could
not have been the tribe's intention.
Federal agencies spent millions of dollars in the 1970s to draft
just such goals for tribes. More than seven hundred planning
169. Id., 16,301, Recommendation #27; id., 16,303, Recommendation #33.
170. Id., 16,300, Recommendation #18; id., 16,298, Recommendation #18.
171. All-Indian Pueblo Council President Delfin Lovato, Hearing, Bureau of Indian
Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 89.
172. Port Madison Comprehensive Plan, Part 2, 2-3.
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grants were made by the Economic Development Administratiort alone, at a total cost of $25 million.17 3 Unless considerably

more rigorous than the hundreds of tribal plans already in print,
a new round of plans would be a staggering and needless expense.

The real problem has been getting things done, not writing wish
lists. The only way to guarantee programs' compatibility with

tribes' real needs and goals, furthermore, is to let tribes run their
own programs.
The paperwork involved in annually auditing each BIA
organizational unit also would prove formidable and would be
used to justify additional staff and operating budget.' 4 Assuming
audits produced specific, significant recommendations, 7 ' they
probably would not be implemented. General Accounting Office
audits of Bureau programs have been ignored. 76 In 1973, the
Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee commissioned Touche Ross
& Co. to audit the Bureau's Pine Ridge Agency, and their report,
detailed and specific, was never implemented despite congressional pressure. 177 It is doubtful the Bureau ever will impose major management changes on itself without a clear statutory mandate and strict budget discipline from Congress.
173. Computed from data in Economic Development Administration, "Indian Projects Funded By EDA" (December 1977).
174. The task force recommended an increase from 12 to 20 "highly graded people"
in the Bureau's Management Research and Evaluation Unit (MR & E). 43 Fed. Reg.
16,295-96 (1978). (Actually, MR & E already had 19 positions, Hearing, Bureau of Indian
Affairs Reorganization, supranote 12, at 219.) MR & E staff previously had been assigned
such indispensable duties as "reduc[ing] paperwork" and "develop[ing] a program to
train 1BIA employees in the use of the metric system." Id.
175. This anticipates "evaluat[ing] the actual costs of accomplishment of objectives."
43 Fed. Reg. 16,299 (1978). If implemented rigorously, this would lead the way to radical
reform of BIA administration by providing a standard of comparison of programs.
However, the utility of costing programs depends entirely on whether we can measure
program benefits reliably. No matter how precisely program costs are calculated, the subjective estimation of social benefits can be inflated or deflated sufficiently to arrive at any
conclusion. If the Bureau were to devise the estimation method, it could control the
results, and justify any action.
176. E.g., GAO, "More Effective Controls Over Bureau of Indian Affairs Administrative Costs Are Needed (Feb. 15, 1978); GAO, "Controls Are Needed Over Indian
Self-Determination Contracts, Grants, And Training And Technical Assistance Activities
To Insure Required Services Are Provided To Indians" (Feb. 15, 1978); MANAGEMENT OF
INDIAN RESOURCES, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Comm. Print 1976) [report prepared by GAO].
177. Hearings, Occupation of Wounded Knee, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate
Comm. on Interior & InsularAffairs, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973), at 365-506. In 1977,
the tribe petitioned the General Accounting Office to investigate BIA noncompliance.
Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Resolution No. 77-113.
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Musical Chairs. Ducking may involve changing the names of
offices without altering their functions and relocating functional
units. The task force proposed changing the name of the Office
of Indian Services to Office of Community Services "to underline
the comprehensive planning approach.""'8 Relocation of field offices was suggested, 79 as well as transfers of functions and the
establishment of new organizational units at the Central level.' 0
Superficial organizational changes would have forced tribes' advocates to deal with new faces and new lines of authority, and
that would have slowed them down for a while. A whole strategy
of bureaucratic self-defense could be designed with the idea of
shuffling desks and titles faster than Indians can figure out who
really is in charge of what. Seeing how frequently the courts and
Congress vacillate on Indian policy, it is tempting to suppose that
such a strategy already is engaged.
Magnanimous Concessions. Regulatory agencies often can
score points with their clientele by agreeing to do what they were
supposed to do in the first place but didn't. These magnanimous
concessions demonstrate power, not responsiveness, because
agencies can choose not to make them in defiance of their legal
duties. For example, the task force urged the Bureau to comply
more fully with Civil Service regulations. 8 ' Taking this advice
would be an improvement, but nothing more than what the
Bureau has been responsible to do by law for years.
Magnanimous concessions also include promises the agency
cannot keep. The task force recommended "some form of commitment" by the Bureau "to a relatively stable level of funding"
for Indian schools,' 82 but the Indian education budget is fixed by
Congress. In the final analysis, stable tribal education funding
will depend upon development of tribal revenue from taxes and
enterprise. The Bureau cannot, on its own, increase federal subsidies for Indian services. The Bureau can give tribes far greater
control of their own economic resources, however, since the use
of "trust responsibility" to override tribal decisions largely is a

178. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,301 (1978), Recommendation #26; id., 16,299.

179. Id., Recommendation #30; id., 16,302. The Bureau went through another
episode of musical chairs a few years earlier. Hearings,Realignment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Central Office, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on Interior &
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
180. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,295, 16,299-16,301, Recommendations ##1-5.
181. Id., 16,298, Recommendation #21.
182. Id., 16,303, Recommendation #34.
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matter of administrative discretion. This the task force did not
propose to do.
Evaluation
On the whole, implementation of task force recommendations
would have increased staff and administrative costs, consolidated
central control of Indian affairs, limited Indian input, and
decreased Bureau responsiveness to tribal advocacy. No significant growth in employee expertise or effectiveness could have
resulted, and no deregulation of tribal governments and reservation economies would have been achieved. Some individual task
forc:e proposals had merit, chiefly in the field of education, e.g.,
getting BIA schools accredited, reducing the proportion of
federal education funds in discretionary area and Central Office
accounts, and financing Indian higher education students directly
rather than through contracts with a few selected institutions.
Also meritorious were suggestions for a computerized file of Indians possessing "critically needed skills," for "be[ing] sure that
success stories and useful experiments are relayed to other communities as options for solving their problems," and updating the
BIAM."13 The task force urged formalizing the custom of permitting Interior and Justice Department attorneys to file separate
briefs ("split briefs") in litigation involving tribal rights.I84 None
of these ideas got to the heart of the matter, however, because
none would have limited BIA to a service role in Indian affairs.
III.

Circumspection Prevails

Retreat From Change
Historically, we have . . . witnessed countless "Reorganiza-

tions." Each task force study that has preceded every
reorganization has rediscovered the same management problems, organization deficiencies, and the same unmet needs.
[W]hile BIA reorganizations have come and gone, the problems confronting the Indian people have multiplied in complexity and numbers.

.

.

.

We cannot afford another

reorganization which will result in nothing more than more of-

18:.Id., 16,298, Recommendation #22; id., 16,301-303.
184. This originally had been proposed by Attorney General Mitchell, and had been

used successfully by the Interior Department on at least six occasions until discontinued.
Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 9.
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fices, new titles, and a new list of priorities for the same old
problems and needs.""5
Let's try to put an end to this dance here."'
Noting that the task force simply had repeated "general principles," Senator Abourezk complained at the April 1978 overhearings, "We have to quit studying this matter and do
sight
s It
it. ' 187
was "reprehensible" that the task force absolved the
Bureau from its express commitment to change area offices'
functions,"8 ' especially in light of continuing abuses by area directors under Forrest Gerard's assistant secretaryship.1 9 In particular, several Pueblo governors had been given the message that
demanding a voice in selection of a new Albuquerque area director was "biting the hand that feeds you." "This talk about division and to quiet down or you will hurt all the other Indians is
one of the basic ploys used in any colonial power," Abourezk
charged, calling for Gerard's resigration. 19°
Guilt is a powerful tool of bureaucratic self-defense. An effective way to discredit uncooperative public advocates is to blame
them for the retaliation taken by the government. Explaining to
the Select Committee why his department had delayed
reorganization and protected area directors, Undersecretary
Joseph explained that Interior "remain[ed] committed to major
changes, but it is still our intention to insure that they do not
cause major interruptions in the flow of services to Indian people." 1 9' In other words, if Congress pressed too hard for BIA
reform, it would bear responsibility for hurting Indians. Service
interruption can be used as an argument against any administrative change, of course, no matter how mild or how
necessary.
185. Delfin Lovato, id. at 12.
186. Senator Abourezk, id. at 133.
187. Id. at 1, 110.
188. Id. at 6, 111, 116, 130, 140. "For sheer temerity," Senator Abourezk told the Interior Department witnesses, "I think you should get some kind of an award." Id. at 127.
Task force members admitted their area structure recommendations had been based only
on their own beliefs and discussions with BIA personnel. Id. at 146.
189. Id. at 15-17, 20-23, 88, 134-45, 138-39.
190. Id. at 24. "I was so shocked that I wrote a letter to Secretary Andrus asking for
Mr. Gerard's resignation, not only for that reason, but for the reorganization delays and
obfuscations that he has undertaken. In other words, there is a direct violation of his
commitments and promises. . . . [This] is what gives politics a bad name." Id. at 23.
191. Id. at 112, 123.
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Interior was not opposed to purely managerial reforms, "to insUre wiser spending."' 9 2 The area office problem was one of
"personnel" only, the Department argued, of "management"
rather than "organization.' 1 93 Simply increasing the number of
top-level policy directives would improve staff performance, 94
and area office problems, if any really existed, could be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis. "' No commitments would be made on
specific task force recommendations, moreover, until they had
been circulated within the Bureau for review. 196 To avoid
"rushing" this process, Undersecretary Joseph suggested giving it
another three to four years. 9

Interior and Bureau spokesmen argued that abolishing area offices would increase overall staffing and costs,1 96 but had not
hesitated to ask Congress for new funding to hire management
specialists and enlarge the assistant secretary's staff.' 99 Task
force member Ted Marston told the Select Committee that the
Bureau should be strengthened before attempting any structural
changes, i.e., fattening as a prelude to dieting.200 As for selfdetermination, tribes must learn that "consultation does not
mean that the agency relinquishes its appointment authority" or
other management prerogatives. 21' "Why bother even to consult
with them," wondered Committee ' 22Chairman Abourezk, "if
you're not going to listen to them?
A General Accounting Office study of BIA administrative costs
released in February 1978 underscored the need for prompt
192. Id. at 122.
193. Id. at 129, 134.
194. Id. at 136; see also id. at 147-48, 150, from task force member Tom Sawyer.
195. Id. at 117, 131, 137.
196. Id. at 118-19, 141.
197. Id. at 129, 142.
198. Id. at 132-33. It is difficult to understand how eliminating an intermediate layer
of management could increase overall personnel needs. Reproducing regionally located
direct services at a large number of local units could necessitate staff increases because of
lost efficiency. No one argued that areas were in the business of providing direct services,
however.
199. Id. at 116, 131. Senator Abourezk failed later that year to impose better cost accounting on federal Indian programs legislatively. Hearings,Indian ProgramEvaluation
and Needs Assessment, Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978). An earlier attempt is recorded in Hearing, National Indian Goals and Progress
Act, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
203. Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 146.
201. Id. at 139.
202. Id.
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reform. Congressional auditors discovered that BIA program accounts concealed costs that properly were administrative. The
Bureau's "3599" administrative account actually was being used
only to clear expenses before charging them to programs, and
therefore substantially underestimated total overhead.20 3 When
Congress ordered the Bureau to reduce its overhead for fiscal
years 1977 and 1978, the agency simply had charged off a greater
portion of the 3599 account to programs, making it appear that
20
administrative costs had fallen.
BIA budgetary legerdemain extended also to personnel requirements. When, in 1976, Congress directed the Bureau to
reduce positions, it reduced only the ceilings on positions
allocated to its functions. 0 5 Since some positions had been vacant, reducing ceilings did not result in any layoffs or cost reductions. Indeed, the Bureau had set its position ceilings well above
its manpower needs, creating in each organizational unit a slush
fund of vacant and superfluous positions for sacrifice in lean
budget years.20 6 Sometimes Bureau units had hired employees
simply out of fear that too many vacant positions would lead to
ceiling reductions; when, in the lean years, BIA units ran out of
vacancies, they customarily separated employees on the last day
compliance was monitored and rehired
of the year when ceiling
20 7
them the next day.
The Bureau also was guilty of converting "permanent" positions into "nonpermanent" positions so that it would appear to
be reducing staff requirements without any real net loss of manpower. 2 8 This had fooled Congress, the Comptroller General
argued, and abused job classification regulations.20 9 Position conversions actually increased costs, moreover, because on the
average nonpermanent positions are more highly paid.
Record-keeping errors, inconsistencies in accounting, and
failures to break down expenditures for multiple programs made
it impossible to measure precisely the Bureau's true overhead.210
However, the Bureau's public estimate of between 2 and 6 per203. GAO, "More Effective Controls Over Bureau of Indian Affairs Administrative

Costs Are Needed" (Feb. 15, 1978), at 2, 15-17.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

8-10.
11-12.
12.
12, 20-22.
22-24.
24.
18-19, 28-33.
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cent clearly was in error, actual overhead being at least 14 to 21
percent. 2 1 The principal reason for high overhead was extreme
"layering and overlapping of duties," the Comptroller General
concluded, to the extent that some units employed one supervisor
for every four employees.
Another Reorganization Counterproposal
Assistant Secretary Gerard responded to GAO and Select Committee criticism by organizing a number of in-house staff committees in May 1978 to review the task force recommendations and
identify implementation options.2" 3 The resulting "decision
documents" would be distributed to area directors and agency
superintendents for comment before submission to Gerard and
Interior Secretary Andrus. Written by outsiders, the original
AIPRC recommendations had been too radical. Written by insiders and outsiders, the task force recommendations had compromised considerably, but still were too radical. Now it was the
turn of Bureau insiders.
The decision documents did not take issue with task force critiques of agency management. Admittedly needed were firm
leadership, performance evaluation and accountability, consolidation of similar activities, more skilled managers, less
employee turnover, and improved morale.2 14 "Indian performance, coupled with uncertain leadership and an absence of a
coordinated effort to improve management skills, ha[d] contributed greatly to low morale and a low level of effectiveness." 2 I A
major overhaul of Bureau organization was not warranted, however, because "[t]he present system appears to be working" and
change might make things worse.2" Implementation of task force
suggestions would be limited to personnel matters and would
minimize structural reform.
Agency Self-Serving Revisited. Task force recommendations
for centralizing power were revised to avoid the risk of losing
power to the Interior Department. Shifting operational control of
the Bureau up from the Commissioner's Office to an enlarged
assistant secretary's office would "requir[e] extreme organiza211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 13.
Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 174-77.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 270; also id. at 230.
Id. at 232; also id. at 366-67.
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tional realignment resulting in employee anxiety and work interruption. 2 17 Instead, the assistant secretary should remain purely
a policymaker and advocate, leaving day-to-day operational control where it always had been, with the Commissioner. 2 8 To keep
the assistant secretary's costly, expanded staff from "undermin[ing]" Bureau operations, moreover, they would serve only as
ad hoc policy advisors and have no direct involvement with field
or program units.
There should be no national Indian Trust Council, the decision
documents warned, for that might "compromise" trust responsibility.21 9 The Bureau must have been less concerned for tribes
than for its own independence from external control, however,
admitting its own difficulty being "a single-minded advocate" of
tribal rights "when that ... runs counter to what appears to be
in the interest of the general public." '
Assistant Secretary Gerard already had taken fire in Congress
for the task force's retreat from breaking the power of area directors, and the decision documents retreated even farther.
Although tribes considered area offices an "obstacle," dismantling them and duplicating their functions at the agency level, as
the AIPRC had proposed, supposedly would increase total BIA
staffing. 22 ' Some "streamlin[ing]" of area structure might be
possible, and each area might operate under an individualized
plan suited to regional needs.222 Area plans would be negotiated
with area directors by the Central Office, not by the tribes served,
however, and area directors would be delegated more power instead of losing power.
Having saved their power, the decision documents deemed it
unwise to make area directors political appointees. Job insecurity
would drive off experienced career employees and frequent turnover could disrupt services. 223 Tribes would suspect politically appointed area directors' loyalty to them, the documents' writers
warned, as if civil-servant area directors' loyalty to tribes was to
be assumed. The problem of incompetent or rogue area directors
could be dealt with by formalizing the process of musical chairs
that tribes had been criticizing. Routine rotation of area directors
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 179.
at 188-93.
at 347.

at 234-35, 243, 245, 248-49.
at 235, 249-53, 258.
Id. at 283.
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would provide them with "versatility and increased skills,"
although at considerable expense.22 4 The fallacy of this plan is
plain, however. Areas fortunate enough to get good directors
soon lose them, and bad directors never get removed from the
system.
The decision documents had no argument with Bureau-wide
staff training or with creating new central-level economic
development offices, conceding the Bureau's lack of technical experience and the failure of development efforts in the past. 2"
This would not mean greater tribal control of resources, however.
According to the documents' draftsmen, economic development
and trust responsibility may conflict,226 hinting that the Bureau
would continue to tell tribes that the economic growth they want
is bad for them and would veto development on the pretense of
exercising trusteeship.
Trust responsibility is not strong enough, though, for the
Bureau to become more actively involved in tribes' legal efforts
to protect their resources. Some forms of "low visibility"
technical assistance to tribes might be increased, but greater
Bureau participation in trust resources litigation would
"provid[e] a focal point for backlash" by non-Indian groups. 227
In other words, when protecting Indians angers non-Indians to
the point of threatening Bureau survival, let the Indians fend for
themselves.
In only one area did the decision documents' draftsmen oppose
centralizing power and increasing staffing: self-determination
contracting. Instead of consolidating this activity in a centrallevel unit as both the AIPRC and task force had urged, the decision documents advised dispersing it throughout the Bureau. 22'
This would raise administrative overhead, but make it clear that
self-determination is "a process not a program." Dispersing contracting duties also probably would increase the difficulty and
white tape of tribes' winning self-determination contracts,
however.
Less Input. Even seemingly innocuous task force recommendations were weakened by the documents' draftsmen. Fearing
political resistance to the suggestion that the Secretary of the In224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
Department
228. Id.

at 285, 288.
at 272-75, 351-54, 357-60, 363.
at 361, 362.
at 337-42, 350. At that time the Indian Affairs Division of the Interior
had 17 attorneys. Id. at 343-44.
at 206-11.
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terior make public statements in support of self-determination,
they proposed simply giving more encouragement to the Bureau's
own, existing Public Information Office. 229 On time and cost
grounds, the decision documents also rejected making the assistant secretary more available to Indians through more road
shows, regular attendance at regional and national tribal
230
meetings, or institution of an annual tour of the reservations.
It would be sufficient for the assistant secretary to hold open office hours once weekly in Washington, although this might invite
23
confrontations and "mob psychology" with angry Indians! 1
"Consultation" was another victim. Although BIA consultation with tribes admittedly had "regressed to a compilation of
facts and opinions collected on a haphazard basis used at random
at the discretion of Bureau officials," the decision documents
recommended permitting each BIA unit to define for itself how
and when tribes should be consulted. 232 Tribes would have no
minimum right to be heard, nor "veto power. ' 2 33 No commitment should be made to heed individual tribes' education goals,
either, because they might be "inconsistent" with Bureau
policy. 234 The Bureau should not cede control of any part of Indian education to regional or national Indian education committees appointed by tribes because to do so would "contradict"
self-determination. 23 The Bureau was protecting itself from both
sides. Listening to individual tribes would be an abdication of
trusteeship; listening to multi-tribal committees would violate individual tribes' right to self-determination.
The PaperMill Grows. Conceding the paucity of meaningful
program standards and objectives, the decision documents placed
the blame on Congress and the "delicate balance" between selfdetermination and trust responsibility, not on mismanagement.23 6
The Bureau's critics "in fairness" should understand that accountability deteriorated "at a time when major changes occurred in Indian policy, and much uncertainty has existed as to
the proper role of [the] Bureau. 2 37 Most employees simply had
"not received necessary guidance in helping them adjust" to self229. Id. at 280-81.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 195-200.
Id.
Id. at 407-409, 412.
Id. at 411.
Id.at 371-74.
Id. at 380-83.

236. Id. at 307.
237. Id. at 313.
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determination. Considering that the self-determination policy
already was eight years old, however, this excuse does not reflect
favorably on BIA management.
To better relate funding to tribes' real needs, the documents'
writers recommended doing more band analysis and more needs
assessments. 238 Both devices had failed in the past, but under new
leadership the Bureau predicted they would forge a "cohesive
working relationship" with tribes, provide "better justifications
for added funding," and "be received more favorable [sic] by the
' In principle, tribes would bear primary responsibility
public." 239
in the future for this process, but the Bureau might not always be
able to follow tribes' wishes. 24 0 In short, nothing would change.
Formalizing "management by objectives" would prove too
costly and would elevate "process over program," the
documents' draftsmen concluded. 24' It would be preferable simply
to establish policy through the existing "directives system,"
codified in the BIAM, "where we find our sense of purpose and
our reason for being.' '242 Updating and maintaining the directive
system would require a new office and more1 staff positions, of
course, and an annual budget of $300,000.24
More important than the way organization objectives are
disseminated is the way they are enforced. The decision
documents adamantly opposed any form of independent, external
evaluation of Bureau performance. Although an outsider's work
"could not be said to be either a whitewash or self-serving...
the contractor's lack of knowledge of Bureau programs and of
the BIA mission might result in either a superficial evaluation or
an evaluation which does not take into account the real needs of
the tribes. ' 244 Interior Department evaluators were rejected for
the same reasons.245 Only a "Bureau team would not have a hidden agenda,'
i.e., could be trusted to keep the agency's surtherefore should be the job of a new
ival foremost. Evaluation
office within the Bureau.2 4 7
238. Id. at 289-90, 292, 300-301.
239. Id. at 256, 258.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 308-309, 312.
242. Id. at 311-12.
243. Id. at 328, 331.
244. Id. at 226-27; also id. at 316-17.
245. Id. at 315-16.
246. Id. at 318.
241. Id. at 220-27, 318. It might be asked how a new office with new employees
would be any more knowledgeable of BIA than an outside contractor-unless the Bureau
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Deeper Motives. The underlying tenor of the decision
documents was survival. Indicative were some of the reasons
given by the documents' writers for opposing task force recommendations: "morale problems," "employee anxiety," "undermining program directors," overlook[ing] BIA input," admitting
past errors, and being forced to separate employees.2 4 Even a
sense of spite emerges in the draftsmen's warning to tribes that
they will lose their "whipping boy," the Bureau, should
reorganization actually succeed in "provid[ing] better service
delivery," as if that were a reason not to make changes .249
The decision documents reflected BIA fear of preemption by
general federal human services agencies and intimated that too
much tribal criticism of the Bureau might prove self-defeating.
Suggested transfers of Indian education programs to DHEW or
to a new Department of Education would erode trust responsibility
and Indian preference and reduce service qudlity, the documents
warned tribes, urging instead that all Indian programs be consolidated under Bureau control.2 50 "It is the trend to establish
numerous programs for Indians in various federal agencies under
the assumption of 'improvement in services,'" the documents'
draftsmen observed. "Are we doing things now to perpetuate the
analysis will result in the Indians losing
trend that in the final
'25
their own agency?" '
On the other hand, the Indians' "own agency" as yet was unprepared to share its power with tribes. Direct formula funding
of tribal government programs without continuing BIA supervision was dismissed as "political," "unrealistic,". "inequitable,"
and "too expensive. 2 1 2 If directly funded, tribes would suffer
the "loss of Bureau expertise," the decision documents argued,
forgetting the Bureau's repeated admissions of technical incompetence. 2 5 The documents' writers even suggested that direct
funding "discourages planning," hinting that tribes would use
direct funding irresponsibly. 25 4 Direct funding might be considered in education, but only if tied to BIA needs assessments.25 5
assumed it would be transferring into the new evaluation branch long-term employees.
Long-term employees had made the system bad in the first place, however.
248. Id. at 178, 188, 189, 191, 210, 215, 232.
249. Id. at 235.

250. Id. at 402-406.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 362.
Id. at 302, 299.
Id. at 302-303, 305.
Id.

255. Id. at 400-401.
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Congress Concedes Defeat
In August 1978 the Senate Select Committee again held oversight hearings on the status of reorganization. Assistant Secretary
Gerard reaffirmed his position that "any organizational changes
should be fundamental-not cosmetic, '" 2 6 using guilt to justify
continuing delay. "[I]t is easy to move boxes and titles on an
organization chart, but the victims of such actions would be the
Indian people themselves." ' 2 7 Delays in some instances were due
to "elements within the Bureau who are resistant to change," but
Gerard warned the Select Committee not to interfere with his
"management prerogative" to reorganize in his own way and at
his own pace." 8
Action had been taken on about half of the task force recommendations, 2 9 but was of debatable significance. Most task force
proposals were in planning or restudy, e.g., the assistant secretary
had "issued a mandate requiring a plan" for updating the
BIAM. 260 Band analysis had been modified but had not been
replaced with zero-base budgeting as the Interior Department had
promised. 26 ' Only one task force recommendation had been implemented fully, according to Bureau witnesses: the assistant
secretary would "periodically state publicly his support [for] Indian self-determination. ' 262 No cost reductions were anticipated.
Instead, the Bureau had submitted requests for additional
funds
263
to plan the establishment of new organizational units.
For Committee Chairman Abourezk, these "cosmetic changes"
meant "business as usual" and "indefinite" delay of fundamental reforms.26 4 His retirement from the Senate a few months later
relieved the Bureau of its most aggressive critic and guaranteed
failure of the reorganization movement. In September 1978 the
Bureau reduced its "decision documents" to a "Management Improvement Plan" (MIP). 265 The division of Bureau leadership in256. Id. at 6, 131, 140.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2, 16.
259. Id. at 3, 7-8, 18, 28-29. Some action or decision reportedly had been made on
Recommendations ##2-5, 11, 13, 15-17, 19, 21, 22, and 27.
260. Id. at 4, 9-11, 26-27. Updated, BIAM would become the "bible" for field staff,
BIA witnesses predicted. Id.
261. Id. at 23-25.
262. Id. at 22. "That's nice," Select Committee Chairman Abourezk retorted. Id.
263. Id. at 13, 22.
264. Id. at 31-32.
265. Hearing, Budget of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for Fiscal Year 1980, Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., IstSess. (1979), at 5.
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to a policy chief (assistant secretary) and operations chief (Commissioner) was finalized, 2" but other MIP action consisted chiefly of initiating new studies, including contracts with Price
Waterhouse & Co. to propose a new accounting system ("Project
Integrity") and with the Sterling Institute to write a "concept
paper" on consolidating BIA technical assistance and training
units.2 67 New internal committees had been assigned to review the
old internal committees' suggestions for a national administrative
268
services center, data processing, and personnel management.
By the time the Bureau announced its fiscal year 1980 budget,
new excuses had been found for delays and inaction. Although
the Bureau "realized . . . [w]e must make major changes in our
systems, structures, and management," 26 9 too much had been expected of it. "As a result of the history of conflicting [congressional] policies.., the BIA has been used and viewed as the focal
point for criticism of the Federal-Indian relationship, while the
agency itself has been in a serious state of upheaval and
neglect." 2 7 This is coopting the clientele, i.e., asking Congress
and critics to feel sorry for what they did to the agency, diverting
attention from what was done by the agency to Indians. It is a
plea for a second (or third, or fourth) chance.
"Within the spirit of Tribal self-development and enlightened
public administration," Assistant Secretary Gerard assured the
Select Committee in March 1979, "the MIP approach may well
demonstrate the Bureau's ability to correct its own mistakes and
set its course anew to meet the challenge and the opportunity of
Indian people in the 21st century.12 71 Overstating the significance
of MIP is not this flag-waving statement's only flaw. It assumes
that the Bureau will be around twenty-five years from now when,
according to the principle of self-determination, its usefulness
long since would have ended. "[N]o matter how much reshuffling
or reorganizing that you do," Tesuque Pueblo Governor James
and that
Hena observed, "you never seem to get at the problem,
' 272
is to get rid of some of the excess staff people.

266. Id.

267. Id. at 5-6, 8-11.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 5-9.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 11.
Hearing, Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, supra note 12, at 89.
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Conclusion: The Survival Syndrome

The concrete final results of MIP vindicate the Bureau's surviv l optimisim. Third-round management improvement studies
have resulted in budget increases; the Bureau's "concept paper"
on consolidating training and technical assistance alone cost the
taxpayers an additional one-half million dollars. 2 "1Wherever the
Bureau has been unable to win new Central Office management
positions from Congress, it has used reorganization to justify
converting direct services field positions into administrative
ones. 7 This centralization of manpower has resulted in a
decrease in service delivery capability and an increase in the cost
of personnel. 275 Although the "Indian Intake" internship program proposed by the AIPRC has begun-at an annual cost of
$800,000-about half of the newly created entry level positions
are administrative. 276 Under questioning by the Select Committee
last year, Deputy Commissioner Seneca admitted that the
Bureau's ability to meet tribes' technical needs had not improved;
tribes were being referred to other federal agencies.2 7
Reorganization has accomplished little for Indians. If the few
management changes implemented by the Bureau have resulted in
greater staff efficiency, there is no evidence that net service output has increased and the Bureau's budget has not decreased. 2"
Cutbacks in permanent positions continue to be offset by increases in higher-paid nonpermanent positions and administrative
overhead remains high. This means reorganization has accomplished a great deal for the Bureau. The Bureau has survived
pressure from both Congress and the Carter Administration in
spite of admittedly poor performance. Once more the Bureau has
been rewarded for planning its own funeral. Surely it has learned
by now that the formula for survival and growth is to confess its
ills--and to be its own doctor.
273. Hearing, Budget of-the Bureau of Indian Affairs for Fiscal Year 1980, supra
note 265, at 10-11.
274. Id. at 28.
275. Id. at 18-21.
276. Id. at 22-23.
277. Id. at 20-21.
273. Phased consolidation of Indian education functions in the new Department of
Education under the provisions of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub.
L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq., may result in some decrease in the
education component of the Bureau's Fiscal Year 1980 and subsequent budgets. It should
be kept in mind that this decrease does not reflect increased BIA efficiency, but a transfer
of programs triggered, indeed, by Congress' concern over BIA inefficiency.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss1/2

